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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
FIRST AMENDMENT ACCESS RIGHTS TO PRETRIAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Brooklier; the Ninth Circuit extended 
the First Amendment right of public access to criminal proceed-
ings beyond the trial proper, to jury voir dire and pretrial 
hearings. 
Petitioners, members of the press, were excluded from por-
tions of criminal proceedings.s Defendants, members of La Cosa 
Nostra,8 were indicted for violations of the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).· 
Petitioners challenged four exclusion orders of the district 
court. II These orders closed the voir dire of prospective jurors, a 
suppression hearing, a hearing on the admissibility of certain ev-
idence, and an order refusing to release transcripts of these in-
camera proceedings before the close of trial. Petitioners con-
tended that these orders violated the first amendment right of 
access as established in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.s 
B. BACKGROUND 
The closure of judicial proceedings to press and public im-
plicates two constitutional rights. The first amendment guaran-
1. 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Browning, C.J.; the other panel members were 
Kennedy and Hug, JJ.). 
2. Id. at 1166. 
3. United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1982). 
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976). 
5. These orders closed the voir dire of prospective jurors, a suppression hearing, a 
hearing on the admissibility of certain evidence, and an order refusing to release tran-, 
scripts of these in-camera proceedings before the close of trail. Id. at 1166. 
6. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). In Richmond, the Supreme Court held for the first time that 
the first amendment guaranteed the public a right of access to criminal trials. Id. at 580. 
45 
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tees a criminal defendant a fair? and open trial.B The sixth 
amendment guarantees the public a right to attend criminal tri-
als.9 In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has ex-
plored the interrelationship of these rights.10 
In Gannett v. dePasquale,l1 the Supreme Court held that 
members of the public have no independent right of access to 
pretrial judicial proceedings under the sixth amendment.12 The 
Court reasoned that our history of open judicial proceedings was 
a common law rule neither incorporated nor rejected by the 
sixth amendment.13 The Court emphasized that, assuming the 
public had a constitutional right to attend criminal trials, such a 
right nevertheless would not attach to pretrial proceedings. 14 
Justice Blackmun, arguing for four members of the Court, 
noted that a suppression hearing is the functional equivalent of 
a trial, and therefore should be treated similarly for the purpose 
of determining constitutionally required access.111 Justice Black-
mun pointed out that while other forms of preliminary hearings 
were closed at common law, none had the dispositive effect of a 
suppression hearing.16 He concluded that the Constitution re-
quires open pretrial suppression hearings in those circumstances 
where an open trial would be required. I? 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 1977). 
8. Gannett v. dePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379 (1978). 
9. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581. 
10. See, e.g., Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), Richmond 
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), Gannett v. dePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1978). 
11. 443 U.S. 368 (1978). 
12. [d. at 387. In Gannett, members of the press had been excluded from a pretrial 
hearing on a motion to suppress allegedly involuntary confessions and certain physical 
evidence in a state prosecution for second-degree murder, robbery, and grand larceny. [d. 
13. [d. at 385-87. 
14. [d. at 387. This conclusion was justified on the historical ground that pretrial 
proceedings were not universally open to the public at common law. [d. at 387·91. The 
Court noted that exclusion was routinely allowed to protect defendant's fair trial right. 
The Court reasoned that pretrial suppression hearings, which did not exist at common 
law, also implicate the fair trial right, because the evidence suppressed may be especially 
prejudicial if learned by the jury. [d. 
15. [d. at 436-37. (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). Although Gannett has never 
been overruled, this dissent has been widely adopted by lower courts. See, e.g., Brooklier, 
685 F.2d at 1167. 
16. 443 U.S. at 436-37. 
17. [d. at 436. 
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One year later, the Court held in Richmond,!8 that the first 
amendment affords a right of access to criminal trials.19 Chief 
Justice Burger, writing the plurality opinion,20 began his consid-
eration of the merits by emphasizing that Gannett had only ap-
plied to pretrial proceedings, implying that the essential consti-
tutional distinction is between trial and pretrial, whether a claim 
of access is made under the first amendment or the sixth amend-
ment.21 The Chief Justice found the requirement of open crimi-
nal trials in an amalgam of the freedoms protected by the first 
amendment, including speech, press and assembly.22 A trial may 
be closed only where there is an overriding interest in closure as 
articulated in findings.23 
Other Circuits 
At the time Brooklier was decided, only the Third and 
Eighth Circuits had addressed the issue of Richmond rights in a 
pretrial setting.B• In In re United States ex rel. Pulitizer Pub-
lishing CO.,26 the Eighth Circuit held that in-chambers voir dire 
of jurors was "inappropriate," absent articulated findings. The 
Court specifically reserved the question whether closure would 
have been appropriate had findings been entered that showed a 
balancing of the interests involved.26 
18. 448 U.S. at 580. The eight Justices participating filed seven separate opinions. 
Justice Powell did not participate. 448 U.S. at 581. Justice Rehnquist filed the only dis-
sent. 448 U.S. at 604. 
19. In Richmond, the defendant was being tried for the fourth time on a murder 
charge. The Court closed the trial to the public, ostensibly to prevent those who had 
seen the previous trials from influencing the jury. [d. at 559-61. 
20. Joined by White and Stevens, JJ. 
21. [d. at 563-64. This led Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, to suggest 
that Richmond had limited the Gannett holding to the narrow question of the applica-
bility of the sixth amendment to pretrial suppression hearings. [d. at 603. In Globe, the 
Court reaffirmed the public's right of access to criminal trials, but made no mention of 
any right of access to pretrial proceedings. 457 U.S. at 603-06. 
22. 448 U.S. at 575. The Gannett Court had reserved the first amendment issue, 443 
U.S. at 392, with only Justice Powell suggesting that the first amendment guaranteed 
access to pretrial proceedings. 443 U.S. at 397. In Richmond, of course, pretrial proceed-
ings were no longer at issue. 
23. 448 U.S. at 581. 
24. In 1983, the Fifth Circuit extended a first amendment right of access to pretrial 
bail reduction hearings. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 1983). 
25. 635 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1980). Pulitizer was brought on a writ of mandamus 
which sought to prevent the district court from closing portions of the jury voir dire in a 
case of attempted extortion of money from United States Senator Thomas Eagleton of 
Missouri. 
26. [d. at 679. The court stated that such findings should indicate that the court had 
3
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In United States v. Criden,27 the Third Circuit held that a 
trial court must enter articulated findings before closing a pre-
trial suppression hearing.28 Since the Third Circuit found that 
first amendment access to pretrial proceedings was not defini-
tively decided in either Gannett or Richmond, the court de-
clined to hold that access was constitutionally required, but 
adopted a policy of presumptive openness under the court's su-
pervisory power.2S 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
1. Voir Dire 
The Brooklier court noted both historical and functional 
justifications for recognizing a constitutional right of access to 
jury voir dire. so First, voir dire was conducted in open court at 
common law.sl Second, the role of public scrutiny is the same for 
voir dire as for the actual trial: access both heightens public re-
spect for the system and safeguards its integrity.s2 
Noting that a majority of the Supreme Court had failed to 
agree upon the proper showing necessary to establish the need 
for closure, the Ninth Circuit adopted the standard articulated 
by Justice Blackmun in his Gannett dissent: an accused seeking 
closure must establish that closure is "strictly and inescapably 
necessary in order to protect the fair trial guarantee."ss Al-
though this standard was formulated to protect a sixth amend-
ment right, and not a first amendment right, the court found 
this distinction to be immaterial.84 
balanced defendant's fair trial rights against the public's acce88 rights. The Pulitizer 
court did not address the possible effect of the proceeding there being pretrial. 
27. 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1982). In Criden, the trial court conducted two closed 
pretrial hearings, during the joint prosecution of four "Abscam" defendants. In one of 
the hearings, no prior notice was given to the public, and the hearing was not announced 
in open court. 
28. rd. at 561. 
29. See generally, United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d I, 7, n.13 (1974) (regarding the 
supervisory power); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (also regarding 
the supervisory power).' 
30. Brooklier, 685 F.2d at 1167. 
31. rd. 
32. rd. 
33. rd. (citing 443 U.S. at 440-42). 
34. rd. 
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The Ninth Circuit described the Blackmun standard as be-
ing comprised of a three part substantive test which is to be ap-
plied once a two part procedural test has been met.311 Mter 
reaching its determination that the procedural requirements had 
not been met, the court declined to address the substantive 
test.3S 
The procedural test requires that those excluded be af-
forded an opportunity to state their objections,3'1 alid that the 
reasons supporting closure be articulated in findings.38 While 
noting that a majority of the Supreme Court had adopted this 
test, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of articulated 
findings for the purpose of providing the appellate court with a 
more complete factual basis for the determination of whether 
the closure order was properly entered.8e The court stressed that 
findings must l>e sufficiently specific to show that the three ele-
ments of the Blackmun test have been fulfilled,40 adding that a 
mere statement that first and sixth amendment interests were 
balanced is insufficient.41 
Having reviewed the reasons for closure stated' by the lower 
court, i.e., that jurors might be less prejudiced by the responses 
35. Id. at 1167-68. 
36.Id. 
37. In order to insure the effectiveness of the right to be heard, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted a limited right to be afforded notice before exclusion is ordered. The district 
court had taken no steps to notify those excluded. Id. at 1168. In Criden, the Third 
Circuit held that, where possible, closure motions must be docketed a reasonable time in 
advance to afford notice. The Criden court noted that in Gannett, most of the Justices 
hypothesized a setting where the closure motion is made in open court, and that individ-
ual notice to interested parties would be impractical. That court therefore adopted the 
docketing requirement under its supervisory power. 675 F.2d at 559. The Brooklier court 
noted the stance taken by the Third Circuit, but merely required that "reasonable steps" 
be taken to afford the public an opportunity to submit its view. 685 F.2d at 1168. The 
right to be heard was abridged by the district court's failure to afford notice to interested 
parties, after the district court had been made aware of those parties' interests. Id. at 
1168. 
38. 685 F.2d at 1168. 
39. Id. Justice Blackmun, speaking for four Justices in Gannett, 443 U.S. at 446, 
and Chief Justice Burger, speaking for three Justices in Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581, both 
stated that articulated findings are required. 
. 40. The findings must show that the accused has demonstrated a substantial 
probability that: (1) irreparable damage to his fair trial right will result from conducting 
the proceedings in public; (2) alternatives to closure will not adequately protect his fair 
trial right; and (3) that closure will be effective in protecting against perceived harm. 685 
F.2d at 1167. 
41. Id. at 1169. 
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of the other jurors and might be less candid in public,42 the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the lower court had not made suf-
ficiently specific findings to inform an appellate court on review. 
The court disregarded the lower court's first reason·3 as unre-
lated to the presence of the public, who could be present even if 
other jurors were excluded." The court rejected the lower 
court's second reason as being both speculative and contrary to 
the assertion of the Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court''O that "[o]penness in court proceedings may im-
prove the quality oftestimony."4e Hence, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that neither reason showed that the trial court found a 
substantial probability that an open voir dire would have re-
sulted in irreparable damage to defendant's right to a fair trial." 
Finally, the court noted that the lower court made no findings 
regarding the alternatives to closure.48 For these reasons, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the procedural prerequisite of ar-
ticulated findings had not been met.·9 
2. Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
The Brooklier court found that the· trial court improperly 
had allowed closure of a hearing on a motion to suppress a state-
ment made by one of the defendants.llo The court noted that the 
lower court had merely stated that the sixth amendment inter-
ests outweighed the first amendment interests, 111 and failed to 
discuss alternatives.1I2 Therefore, the court found it impossible to 
determine whether the trial court had found a substantial 
probability that an open suppression hearing would have re-
sulted in irreparable damage to defendant's fair trial right:13 
42.Id. 
43. The court uniformly uses the word "reason" in describing the lower court's con-
clusions, and studiously avoids the word "finding". Id. at 1166-1169. 
44. [d. 
45. 457 U.S. 596, 609 n.26 (1982) (quoting Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383). 
46. 685 F.2d at 1169. 
47. [d. 
48. When asked by the court for suggested alternatives, petitioner had not offered 
any. 685 F.2d at 1169. The court nonetheless noted that alternatives other than seques-
tration did exist. [d. 
49. [d. 
50. This motion was filed before trial, but heard after the trial had begun. [d. at 
1169-70. 
51. [d. at 1170. 
52. [d. at 1171. 
53. [d. 
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Addressing the issue of whether the public access right ex-
tends to suppression hearings, the court noted that no determi-
nation could be made on an historical basis for the reason that 
suppression hearings did not exist at common law.64 Rather, the 
Ninth Circuit followed the Third Circuit's approach in Criden, 
finding that the applicability of the first amendment should de-
pend on "societal interests."66 The court found that a suppres-
sion hearing implicated the same interests as the trial itself, and 
opined that a majority of the Supreme Court would hold the 
first amendment right of access applicable to suppression 
hearings.66 
D. ANALYSIS 
1. Scope of the Richmond Right of Access 
The Ninth Circuit correctly extended first amendment ac-
cess to pretrial suppression hearings.67 Although there are argu-
54. [d. at 1170. 
55. Criden, 675 F.2d at 555. 
56. 685 F.2d at 1170. The Ninth Circuit held that this closure had violated the first 
amendment because the lower court had made insufficient findings showing both that 
defendant's fair trial rights would be prejudiced by an open hearing, and that there were 
no available alternatives. [d. at 1171. 
The third closure order challenged was ordered not to protect the defendant's fair 
trial right, but to protect a third party's property interest in certain tape recordings of an 
interview with one of the witnesses. [d. The court conceded that protection of a property 
right may be sufficient justification for abridging the first amendment access right. [d. at 
1172. However, a closure ordered to protect a property right must at least satisfy those 
minimum standards required when constitutional rights are involved. [d. at 1171. Peti-
tioner was here afforded no opportunity to object to closure, and no findings were en-
tered. [d. at 1172. This closure consequently failed to pass constitutional muster. [d. at 
1171-72. 
While the trial was still in progress, petitioner filed a motion for release of the tran-
scripts of the three closed hearings. [d. at 1172. This motion was denied. The trial court 
afforded petitioner an opportunity to be heard on the subject, but articulated no findings 
explaining why other alternatives would be inadequate. [d. at 1172-1173. The Ninth Cir-
cuit therefore concluded that the requirement of narrow tailoring had not been met. [d. 
at 1173. Once the danger of prejudice is passed, the Ninth Circuit found denial of the 
motion to be in itself a denial of access, subject to the same procedural prerequisites as 
the initial closure. [d. at 1173. 
57. As Justice Stewart noted in Richmond, seven members of the Court have not 
addressed the question whether the first amendment afforded any right of access to pre-
trial suppression hearings. 448 U.S. at 599. This number was not increased by the arrival 
of Justice O'Connor, who stated in Globe that she would interpret the Richmond deci-
sion narrowly, as limited to criminal trials. 457 U.S. at 611. This may indicate that she 
would not consider pretrial proceedings to be within the Richmond rule. 
The Brooklier court's suggestion that a majority of the Justices would extend first 
amendment access to pretrial hearings is based on the assumption that the Justices join-
7
Posin et al.: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
52 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:45 
ments against requiring access;~8 given the similarities between a 
trial and a suppression hearing, it follows that if a trial is open 
to the public, so should a suppression hearing be open to the 
public:~9 Unlike other pretrial procedures, a suppression hearing 
is conducted like a trial-evidence is presented by means of live 
testimony, and witnesses are sworn and cross-examined. A mo-
tion to suppress essentially is an objection to the introduction of . 
constitutionally inadmissible evidence. While objections to evi-
dence on other grounds are made during the trial, motions to 
suppress are often pretrial, due to the impoi'tance of the consti-
tutional rights they protect. Yet they ultimately remain an ob-
jection to evidence, and should be given the same first amend-
ment protection afforded to objections made during trial. 
Further, the significance of requiring access to suppression 
hearings is underscored by the fact that many cases never go to 
trial.60 However important the need to ensure an unprejudiced 
jury, the danger of prejudice exists only in the small percentage 
of cases that do proceed to trial.61 In those cases that do not 
reach trial,62 the suppression hearing will be the only opportu-
nity for the public to observe the judicial process.6S Therefore, 
ing the Blackmun dissent in Gannett would apply the same reasoning under the sixth 
amendment to find access under the first amendment. 685 F.2d at 1170. Justice Black-
mun implies that this is so in his Richmond concurrence. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 601-604. 
However, Justice White, who had joined Justice Blackmun's Gannett dissent, 443 U.S. at 
406, and without whom there would have been no majority, also joined Chief Justice 
Burger's Richmond decision, which implied that there is no first amendment access to 
pretrial proceedings. 448 U.S. at 558. Any counting of heads is therefore, at best, 
conjecture. 
58. For example, there is an increased danger of publicity; suppressed evidence is 
likely to be extremely prejudicial; and there are a limited number of alternatives 
available. 
59. The Criden court suggested six benefits of openness that would be present in 
pretrial proceedings: (1) promoting informed discussion of governmental affairs; (2) 
greater fairness and greater perception of fairness; (3) providing an outlet for community 
hostility and emotion; (4) inhibiting corrupt practices; (5) enhancing the performance of 
the participants; and (6) discouraging perjury. 675 F.2d at 556. 
60. Such disposition will often turn on the outcome of the suppression hearing. In 
1976, for example, the year in which the proceedings in Gannett took place, every crimi-
nal proceeding in that county was terminated prior to trial on the merits. ·443 U.S. at 
435. 
61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
62. 443 U.S. at 435. 
63. [d. at 434. It will in any event be the only opportunity to scrutinize police and 
prosecutorial misconduct. A motion to suppress typically involves allegations of such 
miaconduct. A decision to admit the challenged evidence will probably result in a guilty 
plea. A decision not to admit the evidence will render irrelevant any misconduct involved 
8
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while public access to pretrial suppression hearings may result in 
prejudice to the jury, public scrutiny must take place at the 
hearing level in order to be effective. 
The Brooklier Court correctly extended first amendment ac-
cess to jury voir dire, as well as pretrial suppression hearings.a. 
However, in rejecting the lower court's contention that potential 
jurors would testify more freely in private, the court failed to 
consider the special characteristics of jurors which may require 
alternatives to complete openness.611 The finding in Globe relied 
upon by the court, that openness may improve the quality of 
testimony,66 can be ascribed to an assumption that psychological 
pressures will cause a witness to be more truthful in a larger 
groUp.67 However, potential jurors are subjected to different psy-
in obtaining that evidence. In neither case will police misconduct be raised in a subse-
quent trial. To protect the public'S interest in knowing of such allegations, although they 
may prove to be unfounded, the hearing must be open to the public. 443 U.S. at 434-36 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). 
64. There is no mention of jurors in either the Globe opinion, 457 U.S. at 611 n.27, 
or the Gannett opinion, 443 U.S. at 383. However, in a subsequent case, Press Enterprise 
v. Superior Court, 52 U.S.L.W. 4113 (1984), the Court adopted a standard of presump-
tive openness for jury voir dire. The Court recognized the "legitimate privacy interests of 
the juror," Id. at 4116, but left open the question of when those privacy interests are 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of openness. Id. The Court noted that the trial 
court had closed six weeks of voir dire without considering alternatives or entering find-
ings.Id. This was held not to comport with the requirements of the first amendment, but 
it is not clear what showing would satisfy the first amendment, as Justice Blackmun 
makes clear in his concurrence. Id. at 4117. 
The majority opinion in Press-Enterprise, written by Chief Justice Burger, sets out 
a test which allows closure only where there is an overriding interest based on findings 
that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest. Id. at 4116. The Court stated that findings must be articulated that are specific 
enough for a reviewing court to determine whether closure was properly ordered. Id. at 
4116. 
65. As a means to protect fairness and preserve privacy, the Supreme Court in 
Press-Enterprise suggested that the trial judge should inform prospective jurors that 
they may request in camera hearings. This is essentially the solution advocated by The 
Revised Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury 
System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 87 F.R.D. 518 (1980), as an alternative to 
closure that would comport with both the first and the sixth amendments, with the addi-
tional requirement that the juror request the in camera hearing to minimize the risk of 
unneccessary closure. Id. at 532-33. 
66. 685 F.2d at 1169. 
67. See FREUD, S., GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 21 (1959): 
There is no doubt that something exists in us which, when we 
become aware of signs of an emotion in someone else, tends to 
make us fall into the same emotion; but how often do we not 
successfully oppose it, resist the emotion, and react in quite an 
opposite way? Why, therefore, do we invariably give way to 
9
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chological pressures than are witnesses, and the holding should 
not be extended to include them.68 A witness generally testifies 
to knowledge he has regarding occurrences and facts exterior to 
himself and thus not intrinsically related to his personality. In 
this case, the presence of a larger group where first amendment 
access is allowed may encourage truthfulness because, by ap-
pearing truthful, the witness will hope to gain social accept-
ance.68 A prospective juror, on the other hand, often must relate 
such personal matters as his own opinions, biases, and 
prejudices. In this case, the impetus to gain social acceptance 
through truthfulness is overshadowed by the desire to avoid di-
VUlging any socially unpopular views.70 Thus, while in each case 
the person testifying will seek social acceptance, the presence of 
the larger group where first amendment access is allowed may 
result in greater truthfulness in the case of witnesses, and lesser 
truthfulness in the case of prospective jurors.71 . 
Jurors also can be distinguished from witnesses on an his-
torical basis. While trials have traditionally been open, jury de-
liberations have been closed to the public.72 Closure of jury de-
liberations not only ensures that jurors reach a verdict free of . 
this contagion when we are in a group? Once more we should 
have to say that what compels us to obey this tendency is imi-
tation, and what induces the emotion in us is the group's sug-
gestive influence. 
68. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1918) (regarding the use of extra-judi-
cial materials in legal analysis). 
69. See SKINNER, B.F., SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 418 (1953): 
70.Id. 
The forces which shape ethical behavior to group standards 
are powerful. The group steps in to suppress lying. . . and so 
on, because of immediate consequences to its members. Its be-
havior in so doing is eventually a function of certain character-
istics of the "good" and "bad" behavior of the controlled indi-
vidual. Among· these is lack of conformity to the general 
behavior of the group. 
71. In other words, the pressure exerted by a group in favor of truthfulness is 
merely one manifestation of the greater pressure for conformity with group standards, 
and, in the case of prospective jurors, the appearance of conformity depends on the con-
tent of statements made by the jurors, and not merely on their appearance of truthful-
ness. The possible adverse effect of openness on a juror's truthfulness is explicitly recog-
nized in Press-Enterprise where Justice Blackmun stated, "the defendant has an interest 
in protecting juror privacy in order to encourage honest answers to the voir dire ques-
tions. The State has a similar interest in protecting juror privacy, even after the trial -
to encourage juror honesty .... " 52 U.S.L.W. at 4117 (concurring opinion). 
72. The Right to Privacy of Prospective Jurors During Voir Dire, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 
708, 719-720 (1982). 
10
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fear of retribution, but also protects the juror's independent 
right of privacy.78 Justice Blackmun argued in favor of access to 
suppression hearings on the ground that such hearings differed 
from other pretrial proceedings, and are analogous to the trial. 74 
Conversely, jury voir dire is analogous to jury deliberations, 
rather than to the trial.711 Jurors in voir dire therefore should be 
afforded a similar right of privacy.7s 
2. The Standards Applied in Brooklier 
The Brooklier court held that there are two procedural pre-
requisites to closure of a criminal proceeding: an opportunity for 
those excluded to be heard, and articulated findings.77 Upon 
finding that the procedural test had not been met, the court ex-
plicitly refrained from addressing the substantive test.7S While 
the procedural test specifically does call for articulated findings 
in support of closure, it prescribes findings without regard for 
either the number or particular import of those findings. How-
ever, the court's conclusion that the articulated findings require-
ment had not been met would appear to turn entirely on the 
application of the substantive test. The court's conclusion that 
the articulated findings requirement had not been met was 
based on the trial court's failure to demonstrate one of the ele-
ments of the substantive test: the substantial probability of ir-
reparable harm arising from the court's refusal to order closure. 
Given that the court's determination was essentially sub-
stantive rather than procedural, as the court preferred to view it, 
the question arises as to the rationale behind the court's mis-
leading approach. That is, for what reason did the Ninth Circuit 
refrain from simply deciding the case on substantive grounds, 
rather than under the pretext of the procedural test? While the 
court emphasized the need for articulated findings sufficient to 
inform an appellate court of the factual circumstances and is-
sues before review, the court was implicitly focusing its analysis 
on the strength of the arguments, for which the substantive test 
73. [d. 
74. 433 U.S. at 436-37. 
75. But see Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 553 S.W. 2d 270 (1970). 
76. Note that even if the public is excluded, a potential juror may have to respond 
in front of a large number of people. 87 F.R.D. 518 (1980). 
77. 685 F.2d at 1167-68. 
78. [d. at 1167. 
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would appear to have been tailored. But the substantive test was 
adopted by only four members of the Supreme Court, which 
raises questions as to its precedential value. The Ninth Circuit, 
in deciding the Brooklier case under the guise of the procedural 
test, applied standards adopted by a majority of the Supreme 
Court. Hence, it appears that the Ninth Circuit wished to decide 
Brooklier under the authority of Supreme Court precedent, 
rather than risk being subsequently overruled on the grounds of 
its application of a substantive test of questionable precedential 
value. 
The Ninth Circuit cleverly adopted a substantive test with-
out appearing to do so. It is unfortunate that the manner in 
which the substantive test was adopted seems to have precluded 
the court from undertaking a more thorough analysis of the sub-
stantive test itself, and perhaps from adopting the constitution-
ally sounder approach espoused by Justice Powell. As Justice 
Powell noted in his Gannett concurrence,79 by placing the bur-
den on the party seeking closure to show both probable 
prejudice and a lack of alternatives, the fair trial right is subor-
dinated to the public's right of access.80 
Justice Powell's approach, which shifts the burden to those 
excluded to show alternatives,81 is preferable for two reasons. 
First, sound constitutional interpretation should give competing 
constitutional provisions equal weight where possible.82 Second, 
as a practical matter, placing the burden of showing alternatives 
on those excluded is a fairer and more efficient manner of dis-
covering those alternatives.8a 
79. 443 U.S. at 400. 
SO.Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, where the court stated: 
There is no single divine constitutional right to whose reign all 
others are subject. When one constitutional right cannot be 
protected to the ultimate degree without violating another, the 
trial judge must find the course that will recognize and protect 
each in just measure, forfeiting neither and permitting neither 
to dominate the other. The public enjoys a first amendment 
right of access to pretrial bond reduction hearings. That right, 
however, must accommodate other constitutional rights. 
Id. at 365; See also Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976). 
83. We need only look to the instant case, where counsel for the media was unable 
to offer any alternatives when requested to do so by the court. 685 F.2d at 1169. 
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Defendants who must show the negative proposition that no 
alternatives to closure adequately would have protected their 
rights are placed in the anomalous position of having to first 
suggest a position contrary to their interests, and then attack 
that position as not adequately protecting their rights. Apart 
from any question of fairness,8. neither party has an incentive to 
suggest strong alternatives that will protect the rights of both 
parties. Placing this burden on those excluded, as Justice Powell 
suggests, would improve the quality of suggested alternatives, 
and would equally protect both first and sixth amendment 
interests.811 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Brooklier opmIOn raises two issues regarding first 
amendment access to criminal trials: in which proceedings 
should such access be required; and, where required, in which 
situations may closure be nonetheless allowed? In each case, the 
approach adopted by the Ninth" Circuit favors maximum expan-
sion of the public liccess right. This note maintains that in some 
instances the Ninth Circuit extended this access right beyond 
that which a majority of the Supreme Court would agree to, and 
further than the interests served by such access should allow. 
However, the confused and contradictory opinions of the Su-
preme Court make it virtually impossible to say with any cer-
tainty which Justices would agree to which theories, or even 
what interests are served by public access. In such circumstances 
it is neither surprising nor necessarily erroneous that the Ninth 
Circuit has adopted a test espoused by a dissenting minority of 
the Supreme Court, in a case that has not been overruled, re-
garding a different constitutional amendment. 
Whatever the merits of the scope of, and standard for access 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the overriding virtue of the 
84. Some of the same interests implicated here are found in the fifth amendment 
prohibition against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 
(1966) (where the Court stated: "[tJo respect the inviolability of the human personality, 
our accusatory system of justice demands that the government seeking to punish an indi-
vidual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors. . . "). 
85. The Supreme Court stated in Press-Enterprise that findings must show that 
closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve an overrid-
ing interest. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4116. No indication is given whether this is meant to be a 
substantive test along the lines of that suggested by Justice Blackmun in Gannett. If it 
is, the question remains open which party has the burden of showing these elements. 
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Brooklier opinion is that the court has adopted a firm position 
in a muddled area of the law, which will promote caution and 
clarity on the part of the district courts in those instances where 
closure is considered. 
Mitchell L. Posin* 
UNITED STATES V. WAYTE: SELECTIVE PROSECUTION 
AND THE RIGHT TO DISSENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Wayte,i the Ninth Circuit held that 
government prosecution of a nonregistrant for military conscrip-
tion who publicly proclaimed his opposition to registration did 
not constitute wrongful selective prosecution.2 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1984. 
1. 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Wright, J.; the other panel members were 
Coughenour, J., and Schroeder, J., dissenting). 
2. Id. at 1388. The Ninth Circuit also held that 50 U.S.C. § 463(b), the clause in the 
Military Selective Service Act providing for no "regulation" to be effective until 30 days 
after publication in the Federal Register, did not apply to presidential proclamations. 
Section 463(b) provides: 
All functions performed wider this title (sections 451 to 471a 
of this Appendix) shall be excluded from the operation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (60 Stat. 237) (sections 551 et 
seq. and 701 et seq. of Title 5) except as to the requirements 
of section 3 of such Act (section 552 of Title 5). Notwithstand-
ing the foregoing sentence, no regulation issued under this Act 
shall become effective until the expiration of thirty days fol-
lowing the date on which such regulation has been published 
in the Federal Register. Mter the publication of any regula-
tion and prior to the date on which such regulation becomes 
effective, any person shall be given an opportunity to submit 
his views to the Director on such regulation, but no formal 
hearing shall be required on any such regulation. The require-
ments of this subsection may be waived by the President in 
the case of any regulation if he (1) determines· that compliance 
with such requirements would materially impair the national 
defense, and (2) gives public notice to that effect at the time 
such regulation is issued. 
50 U.S.C. § 463(b). The Ninth Circuit also held the Selective Service requirement of a 
GO-day notice and comment period before registration regulations become effective does 
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On July 2, 1980, President Carter issued Presidential Proc-
lamation 4771, directing all males born in 1960 to register for 
military selective service during the week of July 21, 1980.3 The 
defendant sent letters to the President and Selective Service de-
claring his intent not to register. The government contacted the 
defendant twice in 1981, urging compliance and warning him of 
possible criminal penalties for failure to do so. On July 22, 1982, 
after continued refusal to register, the defendant was indicted.· 
After an evidentiary hearing on the issue of selective prose-
cution, the federal district court dismissed the indictment;' 
holding that the government had failed to rebut the defendant's 
prima facie showing of wrongful selective prosecution.s The gov-
ernment appealed. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Supreme Court 
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,' the Supreme Court first applied 
the impermissible motive test to prosecutions under an other-
wise valid statute. In Yick Wo, two city ordinances required all 
commercial laundries in San Francisco housed in wooden build-
ings to obtain an operating permit.8 The Supreme Court found 
that the ordinances, though valid on their face as public safety 
measures, were impermissibly employed to withhold permits 
from Chinese owned laundries.s The court held that there is an 
equal protection violation when officials enforce a valid statute 
in a discriminatory fashion. 10 
not apply to a regulation based on an executive order. 710 F.2d at 1389. 
3. Males born in 1961 were to register during the week of July 28, 1980. Males born 
in 1962 were to register during the week of January 5, 1981. Males born after 1962 were 
to register on or about the time of their 18th birthday. Presidential Proclamation 4771, 
45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980). The defendant in Wayte was born in 1960. 
4. 710 F.2d at 1387. 
5. United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (per Hatter, J.). 
6. [d. at 1385. The district court also held that Presidential Proclamation 4771 was 
invalid for noncompliance with the 30-day notice and comment period requirement of 
the Military Selective Service Act. [d. at 1391. 
7. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
8. [d. at 357-58. 
9. [d. at 362. 
10. [d. at 373-74. 
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In Oyler v. Boles,11 which involved the imposition of a 
mandatory life sentence on persons with three felony convic-
tions, the Supreme Court outlined the standard for determining 
the discriminatory application of a valid statute. I2 Challenging 
the application of the statute, the defendant claimed that 
wrongful selective prosecution had occurred since not all three-
. time felons were similarly sentenced. In rejecting the defen-
dant's claim, the Supreme Court stated that there was nothing 
unconstitutional about selective prosecution per se,13 and added 
that only selectivity based upon an impermissible prosecutorial 
motive violated the Equal Protection Clause.H The Court ex-
plained that selection based on an arbitrary classification, . such 
as race or religion, constituted an impermissible prosecutorial 
motive. 1II Selection based on the prosecution's ignorance of t,he 
determining factors in a case, such as how many times someone 
had been convicted of a felony, was permissible so long as the 
prosecution acted in good faith. IS Accordingly, selectivity exer-
cised on the basis of an honest belief that all known violators of 
a law were being prosecuted was constitutional,I7 
2. Circuit Court Decisions 
Although the Oyler Court did not enunciate a standard to 
determine when the prosecution's legitimate discretion becomes 
wrongful selective prosecution, the circuit courts employing the 
Oyler rationale require the defense to show that a defendant was 
prosecuted while others in a similar criminal situation were not, 
and that the prosecution was the product of an impermissible 
motive. 
Though there were no' circuit court decisions involving draft 
registration at the time of the Wayte decision, an analogy can be 
made to decisions involving tax resisters and others who claimed 
11. 368 u.s. 448 (1962). 
12. Id. at 456. 
13.Id. 
14.Id. 
15. Other arbitrary classifications have been defined by later circuit court decisions 
as including political beliefs and peaceful public agitation in support of those beliefs. See 
United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Falk, 479 
F.2d 616, 619-20 (7th Cir. 1973). 
16. 368 U.S. at 456. 
17.Id. 
17
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wrongful selective prosecution. 
In United States u. Steele,18 which involved a public re-
sister of the 1970 census who challenged his conviction for refus-
ing to answer questions on his census form,19 the Ninth Circuit 
examined the requirements of the Oyler test.20 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, in reversing the conviction, stated that the government ini-
tiated the prosecution solely because of the defendant's public 
opposition to the census.21 The court focused on the govern-
ment's ability to identify persons who refused to furnish census 
information.22 Although the census information system automat-
ically revealed the identities of all who failed to return com-
pleted forms, the government prosecuted only those who pro-
tested the census.28 The defense located six census violators who 
had not publicly opposed the census and had not been investi-
gated or prosecuted.24 Since the only difference between Steele 
and the non prosecuted violators was his public opposition to the 
census, the Ninth Circuit determined that governmental retalia-
tion against this opposition provided the only reasonable expla-
nation for charging the defendant.211 The court, in overturning 
the conviction, held the prosecutorial motive impermissible since 
public protest constitutes a legitimate exercise of free speech.28 
The court also held that a prosecution procedure that focuses on 
protesting offenders is inherently suspect.27 
The impermissible prosecutorial motive prong of the Oyler 
test provided the basis for rejecting a wrongful selective prosecu-
tion claims in United States u. Wilson.2B The defendants, two 
18. 461 F.2d at 1148. 
19. While Yick Wo and Oyler dealt with city and state statutes, Steele was con-
cerned with federal law. [d. at 1150. Steele began by using the Due Process Clause of the 
fifth amendment to apply Yick Wo and Oyler to a federal defendant. [d. 
20. [d. at 1151. Steele did not formally set out the Oyler test, but it did use the two 
prongs of the test as the criteria for its decision. [d. 
21. [d. at 1152. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. at 1151. 
25. [d. at 1152. 
26. [d. The Ninth Circuit subsequently denied Steele for rehearing on August 9, 
1972. [d. at 1148. 
27. [d. at 1152. 
28. 639 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1981). Wilson was the first Ninth Circuit decision to ac-
knowledge that Oyler had set up the standard two prong test by which wrongful selective 
prosecution claims were judged. [d. at 503. 
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tax violators vocally opposed to the income tax, showed there 
were no prosecutions of others whose W -4 forms apparently 
merited investigation.29 However, they failed to prove that the 
government prosecuted the defendants as a retaliatory measure 
against the exercise of free speech.30 The evidence showed that 
some prosecutions were undertaken against non-protestors, thus 
no impermissible selectivity existed.31 The Wilson court, recog-
nizing that public violators represented the strongest nominees 
for prosecution where willfulness is an element of the crime, 
stated that some selectivity is necessary where budgetary or 
other constraints limit the number of cases that may be 
commenced.32 
In United States v. Ness,33 the Ninth Court rejected an-
other tax defendant's wrongful selective prosecution claim after 
he failed to meet either prong of the Oyler test.34 In examining 
the impermissible motive prong, the court considered the effect 
that selective investigation of violations had on the prosecution 
policy. The court concluded that selective investigation taints 
the prosecution only where the government bypassed normal 
procedures for selecting cases to be prosecuted, or the prosecu-
tor's independent decision was disturbed.311 The Ness court 
noted that in Steele an apparent abnormal selection of cases for 
prosecution occurred because the government compiled back-
ground reports only on protesting census violators.36 The court 
also asserted that the prosecution of those publicly opposing the 
tax laws would deter all tax violators.37 Therefore, the court 
found nothing improper in prosecuting tax violators who were in 
the public eye. 38 
29. [d. at 504. W-4 forms list the number of exemptions an employee is claiming. 
They are tiled with the employer. 
30. [d. at 504-05. 
31. [d. 
32. [d. at 505. 
33. 652 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1981); cert denied 454 U.S. 1126 (1981). 
34. 652 F.2d at 892. 
35. [d. 
36. The Nes8 court compared Steele, 461 F.2d at 1152 (where such improper proce-
dures were present), with United States v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1978) (where the 
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In United States v. Taylor,39 where the president of one of 
the striking air traffic controller union's locals was prosecuted 
for involvement in an illegal strike against the government,40 the 
Ninth Circuit emphasized the deterrent effect of prosecuting 
leaders of a group engaged in illegal activity.u Citing Ness, the 
court approved prosecuting leaders of an illegal strike for the 
purpose of deterring other public employees from striking.41 The 
Court noted that under Steele, where the government investi-
gated only publicly vocal violators and provided no reasonable 
explanation for the selection policy, retaliation against the viola-
tor for exercising his first amendment rights may be presumed.·! 
Nonetheless, the court rejected the contention that Steele pre-
cluded any consideration of a person's public statements in the 
decision to prosecute.44 Where the government is faced with an 
apparently legal act, such as failure to report to work, a defen-
dant's public statements provide the necessary element of willful 
misconduct, and may be used by the prosecution to establish the 
intentionality of alleged illegal conduct.4& 
The Seventh Circuit applied the Steele rationale in United 
States v. Falh,48 and scrutinized the government's motive in the 
prosecution of a publicly vocal draft resister. The defendant in 
Falh showed that the government prosecuted him for failing to 
possess either a selective service registration card or a draft clas-
sification card, though thousands of other registrants who had 
divested themselves of their cards escaped prosecution.47 The 
Falh court acknowledged that Oyler required a successful selec-
tive prosecution challenge to prove a defendant was singled out 
because of an arbitrary classification.48 The court determined 
that the government's retaliation against the defendant's claim 
of conscientious objector status was an arbitrary classification. 
39. 693 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1982). 
40. [d. at 921. 
41. [d. at 923. 
42. See Ness, supra note 33 and accompanying text. The Taylor court also relied on 
Wilson, without specifically citing it on this point, in holding that the government may 
consider whether potential defendants have made their illegal activity clear by their pub-
lic statements or actions. 693 F.2d at 923. 
43. [d. See Steele, supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
44. 693 F.2d at 923. 
45. 693 F.2d at 923, n.5. 
46. 479 F.2d at 616. 
47. [d. at 621. 
48. [d. at 619. 
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Here, the defendant proved both that the draft board summarily 
rejected his claim, and that the Justice Department had explic-
itly approved his indictment.49 The Falk court accordingly held 
that where a defendant makes out a valid prima facie case of 
improper selection, the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution 
to prove the selection was proper.&O 
In United States v. Catlett,&l where the defendant refused 
to pay income taxes as part of a protest against the Vietnam 
War, the Eighth Circuit upheld a government policy of prosecut-
ing publicly vocal violators of the federal tax laws.&2 The defen-
dant in Catlett asserted that the government prosecuted him be-
cause of his vocal resistance to war taxes. &3 The court, in 
rejecting the defendant's claim, distinguished between permissi-
ble prosecution based on the publicity surrounding a violator's 
public protest and impermissible prosecution based on retalia-
tion against a violator who refuses to pay taxes because of a per-
sonal belief that remains uncommunicated to others. &. The Cat-
lett court held that prosecution based on the publicity a public 
protester received was proper since it served a legitimate govern-
mental interest in promoting public compliance with the tax 
laws, an interest absent in cases of uncommunicated violations. && 
As of the time the Ninth Circuit decided Wayte, all but one 
of the selective prosecutions claims raised by defendants in draft 
nonregistration decisions had been denied. &6 Only the district 
court in Wayte&7 has gone against the trend. Although the ma-
jority of decisions differ as to why defendants had not met their 
burdens of proof, these decisions all held that no defendant had 
satisfied the impermissible prosecutorial motive prong of the 
49. Id. at 622-23. Interference with the prosecutor's independent decision had the 
effect of tainting the prosecution, according to Ness, supra note 35 and accompanying 
text. 
50. Id. at 624. 
51. 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978). 
52. Id. at 868. 
53. Id. at 866. 
54. Id. at 868. 
55.Id. 
56. See United States v. Martin, 557 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Iowa 1982); United States 
v. Eklund, 551 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. Iowa 1982); United States v. Ford, Cr. 82-1059 (D. 
Conn. filed July 30, 1982), for cases denying selective prosecution. But see United States 
v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
57. 549 F. Supp. at 1385. 
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Oyler test. liS 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. The Majority 
In reinstating the indictment, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the defendant failed to establish impermissible government re-
taliation against his right to speak out publicly against draft 
registration. 119 
The majority applied the two prongs of Oyler's wrongful se-
lective prosecution test; no prosecution of others similarly situ-
ated and impermissible prosecutorial motive. so The court, rely-
ing on Taylor, found that the first prong of the test had been 
satisfied, to-wit, the government admitted at the time the Wayte 
indictment was dismissed that only twelve men were being pros-
ecuted out of over 500,000 total nonregistrants.s1 
With respect to the impermissible motive prong of the 
Oyler test, the defendant argued that since the government real-
ized only vocal nonregistrants would be prosecuted, the passive 
system enforced against Wayte was tainted.62 Further, the de-
fendant contended that the government's actual awareness of his 
protest activities was irrelevant.6s The court, in rejecting both 
contentions, noted that the defendant had not demonstrated a 
link between his activities and the government's· decision to 
prosecute.6• Without such a link, according to the court, no im-
58. See 557 F. Supp. at 688; 551 F. Supp. at 968. 
59. Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1388. 
60. Id. at 1387. Wayte used the Oyler test, but attributed it to Ness. Id. 
61. Id. In Taylor, the government had conceded that only two striking air traffic 
controllers in the Tuscon, Arizona area were prosecuted. 693 F.2d at 921. 
62. 710 F.2d at 1387. Under the passive enforcement system, the government made 
no effort to locate violators, but relied on information it received about violators as its 
means of identifying candidates for prosecution. D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney 
General, Criminal Division, wrote a memorandum entitled "Prosecution of Selective Ser-
vice Non-Registrants" to United States Attorneys (Mid-Sized Offices) on July 9, 1982. In 
that memo, Mr. Jensen explained that the passive enforcement policy was "designed to 
ensure that (1) the refusal to register is willful and (2) only persons who are the most 
adamant in their refusal to register will be prosecuted." The memo conceded that, with 
this enforcement policy, the tirst prosecutions would probably consist mainly of men who 
. publicly refused to register. 549 F. Supp. at 1381-82. 
63. 710 F.2d at 1387. 
64.Id. 
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permissible prosecutorial motive existed.6& 
With respect to the issue of whether the selection was delib-
erately based upon an improper standard, the court distin-
guished the present circumstances from those in Steele. The ma-
jority noted that in Steele, where only those who vocally 
opposed the census were prosecuted, the census procedure itself 
identified all those who did not cooperate.66 Thus, though the 
government was able to identify all violators of the census, it 
only prosecuted only those who vocally opposed the census. In 
Wayte, . by contrast, selective service registration procedures 
neither identified violators nor established willful disobedience 
of the registration law. Thus, the majority found that the gov-
ernment properly investigated those nonregistered men whose 
names were brought to its attention.67 
The government contended that the use of the passive sys-
tem applied to Wayte was justified since the identity of other 
violators was not known at the time. The court, in accepting this 
argument, noted that the policy of prosecuting violators brought 
to its attention was "logical. "68 Further, the court pointed out 
that the government's present use of an "active" enforcement 
system, whereby both protesting and nonprotesting violators 
would be identified, was evidence of its good faith.69 
The court agreed with the rationale in Taylor that the use 
of a violator's public statements to establish willful disobedience 
of the law constituted a legitimate government act.70 The major-
ity found nothing impermissible in the prosecution's examina-
tion of public protest in order to prove conscious illegal 
activity.71 
65. [d. 
66. [d. at 1388. See 461 F.2d at 1152. 
67. 710 F.2d at 1388. 
68. [d. 
69. [d. The active enforcement system would be based on random selection among 
all nonregistrants. 
70. [d. See 693 F.2d at 923. 
71. The majority subsequently dealt with the issues of notice and comment period 
compliance in Presidential Proclamation 4771 and selective service registration regula-
tions. 710 F.2d at 1388-89. 
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2. The Dissent 
Judge Schroeder, in dissent, addressed only the selective 
prosecution issue.72 After pointing out that the government's 
passive enforcement policy was by definition aimed only at those 
nonregistrants who communicated their offense to others, the 
dissent stated that the policy had the practical effect of exclu-
sively prosecuting public protestors.78 This fact alone was suffi-
cient to prove the first prong, that is no others similarly situated 
were prosecuted, was satisfied.74 
The dissent believed that the defendant had established an 
impermissible prosecutorial motive, since under Steele an en-
forcement policy focusing on vocal offenders is deemed inher-
ently suspect.711 The dissent also pointed that under Falk, the 
government had the burden of proving permissible selectivity 
when it only prosecuted protesting violators.76 The dissent con-
cluded that the government failed to prove a permissible motive 
for singling out the defendant.77 
The dissent rejected prosecution arguments that the passive 
enforcement system was justified because the government could 
not identify non-protesting violators.76 Unlike Wilson, here no 
financial constraints limited the government in investigating vio-
lators.79 The dissent noted that a law student working for the 
defense in Wayte, using only a telephone book, obtained lists 
from various randomly chosen states of persons legally required 
to register.80 By comparing those lists with the government's 
records on actual registrants, there existed a simple method of 
identifying all violators.81 The dissent maintained that the re-
cent implementation of an active identification system demon-
72. See supra note 71. 
73. 710 F.2d at 1389. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 1390. See 461 F.2d at 1152. 
76. 710 F.2d at 1390. See 479 F.2d at 621. 
77. 710 F.2d at 1390. 
78. [d. 
79. [d. See 639 F.2d at 505. 
so. 710 F.2d at 1390. The student phoned Iowa, Michigan, Texas. and Colorado, and 
found that lists of eighteen-year-old persons were readily available. 549 F. Supp. at 1381 
n.6. 
81. 710 F.2d at 1390. 
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strated the availability of alternative enforcement methods.82 
The dissent found no reason why the active identification policy 
was not in effect at the time of the defendant's indictment and 
claimed that the present implementation of the active policy did 
not satisfy the first prong of the Oyler test.83 
The dissent rejected the government's contention that it 
needed the defendant's statements to establish willfulness,1U as-
serting that Taylor was distinguishable from Wayte, since in 
Wayte it was unnecessary to use the defendant's statements to 
show willful disobedience of the law.811 In both cases the failure 
to report to work and the failure to register were acts that could 
have an innocent explanation.8s However, in Wayte the govern-
ment wrote to all suspected nonregistrants requesting compli-
ance, and only prosecuted those who still refused to register.87 
The presence of this method of establishing willfulness indepen-
dent of violators' public protests and letters to the· government 
expressing refusal to comply distinguished Taylor from Wayte. 88 
Accordingly, the dissent voted to affirm the dismissal of the 
indictment.89 
D. CRITIQUE 
The majority correctly found that the government was una-
ware of the identities of any nonregistrants other than those al-
,ready being investigated at the time the defendant was indicted. 
The passive identification system, in force at the time of 
Wayte's indictment, relied either on reports from third parties 
about those disobeying the registration law, or on statements 
from nonregistrants themselves.90 The registration forms failed 
to furnish information that would serve to locate violators. In 
82.ld. 
83. Id. David Alan Wayte was indicted on July 22, 1982. 710 F.2d at 1387. 
84.ld. 
85. Id. See 693 F.2d 919. 
86. See generally Comment, Presumption of Notice: Mens Rea and Draft Registra-
tion - Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 234 (1982) (Criminalliabil-
ity for nonregistration requires proof of notice of the duty to register and an intentional 
failure to perform that duty). 
87. 710 F.2d at 1390. 
88.Id. 
89.Id. 
90. Id. at 1389. 
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contrast, under the active enforcement system presently operat-
ing, the federal government uses vehicle registration records pro-
vided by the states to determine whether an eligible man has 
registered. The names of nonregistrants are kept on file, and in-
vestigation is based on random selection. 
The dissent properly focused on the government's ability to 
identify nonregistrants who remained silent about their disobe-
dience. The dissent apparently misread the majority's finding 
that the government did not identify quiet nonregistrants as a 
determination that the government could not identify them.91 
The majority did not question the government's ability to iden-
tify all nonregistrants. However, the dissent correctly phrased 
the issue of violators' identities in terms of government ability to 
investigate nonregistrants regardless of their public communica-
tions about their crime. Steele held that an enforcement policy 
focusing only on vocal offenders in inherently suspect.92 The use 
of.the active enforcement policy in Wayte justified greater judi-
cial scrutiny of the government's motives than the majority ex-
ercised. With the prima facie case of wrongful selective prosecu-
tion established at the district court level, the burden was on the 
government to prove its selection policy was nondiscrimina-
tory.9a This burden was not satisfied by a mere showing that the 
government made no effort to locate nonvocal violators when it 
had the means to do so. 
Both the majority and the dissent in Wayte chose to ignore 
the fact that there may have been improper interference by gov-
ernment officials in the prosecutor's independent decision. There 
may have been a link between the White House, Selective Ser-
vice and the Justice Department94 through Edwin Meese.911 Gov-
ernment documents made available to the defendant showed 
that Mr. Meese and the White House were concerned with pros-
ecution of nonregistrants.96 Following the Ness reasoning,97 
there is a strong inference of improper involvement by Mr. 
91. [d. 
92. 461 F.2d at 1152. 
93. 710 F.2d at 1390; 479 F.2d at 621. 
94. See Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1382. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. 
97. The district court in Wayte did not cite Ness, although it followed the Ness 
disposition of this issue. 549 F. Supp. at 1382. See 652 F.2d at 892. 
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Meese and others in the decisions of local prosecutors to move 
against individual defendants.98 Enough evidence of impropriety 
appeared in the record presented to the court to require a re-
sponse, if only to dismiss the notion of improper interference. 
By failing to address this issue, the Ninth Circuit ignored the 
Ness holding and left unresolved the question of executive 
branch involvement in the decision to prosecute the defendant. 
The dissent in Wayte correctly observed that violators' 
communications were unnecessary to show willful disobedience. 
of the law.99 An alternative means of establishing willfulness ex-
isted through the government writing letters to nonregistrants 
warning them of the likelihood of legal action if they persisted in 
their refusal to register. 100 The dissent regarded continual diso-
bedience by any nonregistrant who received a warning letter as 
proof of willfulness regardless of any public statements. There-
fore, the dissent correctly reasoned that Taylor's rationale of us-
ing defendants' public statements to show willfulness did .not 
control in Wayte. Since the government only prosecuted those 
who received warnings and still refused to register, the dissent 
seemed to be attacking a phantom flaw in the prosecution's case. 
However, : only vocal violators who would not register after re-
ceiving warnings were prosecuted, so the government either used 
the willful public protest criteria despite the presence of an al-
ternative, or it only warned vocal violators in the first place. Ei-
ther way, the alternative method of proving willfulness existed 
even though the government did not use it.101 
Another justification for sanctioning a prosecutorial policy 
that only punishes the vocal protestor is the deterrent effect it 
has on the multitude of nonregistrants who remain silent. The 
Ninth Circuit had ample precedent for applying this rationale to 
Wayte. 102 Unfortunately, the deterrence theory is self-defeating. 
Prosecuting the most notorious members of the class of violators 
may achieve some publicity which in turn informs all nonregis-
98. 549 F. Supp. at 1382. 
99. 710 F.2d at 1390. 
100. Id. 
101. Wilson would also not merit consideration of defendant's public 8tatements to 
establish willfulness, since no budgetary or other constraints hampered the government 
investigations in Wayte. 639 F.2d at 505. See 710 F.2d at 1390. 
102. See Ness supra note 37 and accompanying text; Taylor, supra note 42 and 
accompanying text. 
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trants that the government will prosecute violators of the law. 
However, the exclusive focus of the passive enforcement strategy 
by protestors sends a message to the community of eligible men 
that they must not express their belief that registration is wrong, 
or if they do express that belief, they must already have regis-
tered for the draft. A prosecutional policy that rewards silence 
discourages dissent from government policy, and weakens its de-
terrent value against the covert violators who remain relatively 
immune from prosecution. Thus, the government ends up sti-
fling public criticism more than it promotes public compliance 
with the law. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Wayte thus served 
to erode the citizen's constitutional right to free speech while it 
failed to promote a legitimate active prosecution policy using 
random selection of all violators. 108 
Chris Bluemle* 
UNITED STATES V. STEARNS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
PLACES THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE IN JEOP-
ARDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Stearns, 1 the Ninth Circuit held that a 
felony-murder prosecution was not barred by the Double Jeop-
ardy Clausell despite an earlier prosecution for the underlying 
felony. The court's holding marked the first time a circuit court 
has sustained a second prosecution based upon a 'due diligence' 
exception to the double jeopardy rule.8 
103. For a different treatment of the wrongful selective prosecution issue in the con-
text of draft nonregistration, See United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 
1983). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985. 
1. 707 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983) (Per Wright, J.; the other panel members were 
Browning, C.J., and Wallace, J.). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3. The court permitted an exception to the double jeopardy bar "[w)here the State 
is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts 
necessary to sustain that charge . . . have not been discovered despite the exercise of 
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FACTS 
In July of 1974, defendants Stearns and Walker sailed into 
Palmyra, an island 1,000 miles south of Hawaii. The defendants 
arrived in an unseaworthy boat;' low on food, supplies and 
money. 
At about the same time Eleanor and Malcolm Graham 
sailed into Palmyra. The Grahams travelled abroad the Sea 
Wind, a 37-foot boat equipped with state-of-the-art technology, 
which was stocked for a planned two-year cruise. 
By late August only the Grahams and the defendants re-
mained on the island. On August 28th, the Grahams made their 
last communication with their regular radio contact in Hawaii. 
In October, the Sea Wind was spotted in Hawaii with 
Stearns and Walker as its crew. The vessel had been renamed, 
its figure-head removed and its blue trim repainted lavender. 
When questioned by the FBI, Stearns claimed that she and 
Walker had found the Graham's dinghy overturned along the 
beach and had assumed the Grahams had drowned. & Stearns and 
Walker were arrested for the theft of the Sea Wind. 
Within three days of the arrest a search team set out for 
Palmyra. The nine-person group included two FBI agents, three 
Coast Guard divers, a Coast Guard officer, and a man who had 
been on Palmyra while the Grahams were there. The ten-hour 
search produced little evidence to support the government's sus-
picion of foul play.6 
due diligence." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977). 
4. Defendant's boat leaked substantially and was towed into the island's lagoon 
since its engine did not work. Stearns, 707 F.2d at 392. 
5. Walker told the jury and the FBI that the Grahams had probably drowned while 
fishing and had left a will on board giving him the Sea Wind. Brief of the United States 
at 8, U.S. v. Stearns, 707 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983). The defendants told conflicting stories 
to their friends. Walker first told a friend that he won the Sea Wind in a chess match. 
Stearns told another friedn that she and Walker had purchased the Sea Wind from the 
Grahams, who were tired of maintaining it. Stearns later stuck to the story that the 
defendants found the Graham's dinghy overturned and assumed that the Grahams had 
drowned. They took the Sea Wind because they thought that Malcolm Graham's state· 
ment, "make yourself at home" meant that she and Walker could have the Sea Wind. [d. 
at 7. 
6. 707 F.2d at 394. The FBI tested the Grahams dinghy and found it could not be 
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Stearns and Walker were convicted of theft. Walker's con-
viction was vacated as a result of an erroneous jury instruction. 
His second theft indictment. was dismissed on speedy trial 
grounds. 
In February 1981, skeletal remains of Eleanor Graham were 
discovered by a couple visiting Palmyra. Her skull and bones 
were found on a coral reef and another bone was found nearby 
in an overturned metal box.7 
Stearns and Walker were indicted for the felony murder of 
Eleanor Graham. The underlying felony charge was theft. The 
defendants moved for dismissal on grounds of double jeopardy.s 
The district court held the felony murder prosecution permissi-
ble, applying the due diligence exception to the double jeopardy 
rule.9 
overturned even though four men tried to do so. Experts advised the government that 
the outboard motor showed no sign of having been immersed in salt water. The last two 
pieces of evidence cast considerable doubt on the defendants' story of finding the dinghy 
overturned. Defendants gave contradictory and false statements to friends and authori-
ties regarding the disappearance of the Grahams. Defen~ants were the only other people 
on the island at the time that the Grahams disappeared. Testimony of four persons who 
shared the island at various times with the Grahams and defendants told of the develop-
ing hostility toward each other. Appellant Stearns Opening Brief at 4, 5, 21, U.S. v. 
Stearns, 707 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983). 
7. The box had been closed with electrical wire. 707 F.2d at 392. The box and bones 
had been subjected to very high temperatUres. Id. This fact casts doubt on defendants' 
story of an accidental drowning. 
8. Walker also moved to dismiss the felony murder indictment on grounds of res 
judicata. Walker pointed out that his theft indictment was dismissed (with prejudice) on 
constitutional and statutory speedy trial grounds. He claimed that the principles of res 
judicata forever barred the government from charging Walker again with the felony of 
theft. 
However, Walker was not retried on the identical cause of action. Walker now seeks 
to preclude trial on the charge of theft, not felony murder, and collateral estoppel, not 
res judicata applies. Collateral estoppel may only be successfully applied when the issue 
was litigated and decided on the merits. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-4 (1970). 
Walker's felony indictment was dismissed on speedy trial grounds. Thus the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that collateral estoppel did not bar the present prosecution. 
Walker argued that if he is retried on the greater offense the speedy trial protections 
afforded the defendant would be substantially weakened and easily evaded. This, how-
ever, is a speedy trial issue, not a double jeopardy issue. Cf. United States v. Stricklin, 
519 F.2d 1112, 1120-21 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). The court does not 
have jurisdiction to hear a speedy trial motion before the case is litigated. Id. 
9. United States v. Walker, 546 F. Supp. 805, 813 (D.Hawaii 1982), aff'd., U.S. v. 
Stearns, 707 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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B. BACKGROUND 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the fifth amendment pro-
vides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.Ulo 
Disagreement in the Supreme Court concerns the definition 
of the term "same offense."Il The traditional Supreme Court ap-
proach has been to employ the 'same evidence' test.12 The test 
provides that if one statute requires proof of a fact which the 
other statute does not, then the two offenses charged are not the 
same. 18 
In Ashe v. Swenson,!4 a minority of the Court, led by Jus-
tice Brennan, maintained that the double jeopardy clause re-
quires the prosecution in one proceeding, except in extremely 
limited circumstances, of "all the charges against a defendant 
that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode or 
transaction. "111 While advocating a broader conception of 'same 
offense', Justice Brennan took note of potential practical and 
10. u.s. CONST. amend. V. 
The purpose underlying the clause was most articulately stated by Justice Black: 
The State with all its resources and power should not be al-
lowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for 
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing 
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possi-
bility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. 
Green v. Uriited States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). 
11. See Note, Double Jeopardy: Multiple Prosecutions Arising from the Same 
Transaction, 15 AM. CRIM. L.R. 259, 260-62 (1979). 
12. The test is also known as the "Blockburger test." See Brown, 432 U.S. at 166. 
13. "The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a vio-
lation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether 
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact 
which the other does not ... " Blockbu'rger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 
Critics argue that this test has provided little protection from multiple prosecutions. In 
Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) the defendant murdered his wife and three chil-
dren. He·was first tried for the murder of his wife and received a twenty-year sentence. 
He was then charged and convicted of the murder of one of his daughters and was given 
a forty-five year sentence. The prosecution then brought a third trial for the murder of 
one of his sons, and Ciucci was sentenced to death. Since each charge required proof of a 
fact which the other charge did not the government was able to bring mUltiple prosecu-
tions. See Note, Double Jeopardy: Multiple Prosecutions Arising from the Same Trans-
action, 15 AM. CRIM. L.R. 259, 281-85 (1978). 
14. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
15. [d. at 453-54. 
32
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss1/6
1984] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75 
procedural exceptions to this compulsory joinder rule.16 
In Brown v. Ohio,17 the Supreme Court suggested in a foot-
note that "[a]n exception may exist where the Stateis unable to 
proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the 
additional facts necessary to sustain the charge . . . have not 
been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence."18 
Prior to Stearns, U.S. v. Allenl9 was the only decision which 
applied the due diligence exception suggested in Brown.2o Allen 
involved a kickback scheme/n in which four defendants were ini-
tially charged with mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail 
fraud/a2 The government submitted a list of witnesses. At the 
trial the prosecution attempted to call a witness not on the list, 
arguing that at the time of the submission of the list this wit-
ness' role in the kickback scheme had not been "adequately cat-
alogued."23 The court denied the government's attempt to call 
the witness.24 Allen was then acquitted.211 
The government subsequently subpoened documents from 
Allen.26 He was reindicted for mail fraud and conspiracy to com-
mit mail fraud.27 Allen moved for dismissal on grounds of double 
jeopardy. The government argued, inter alia, that its subsequent 
discovery of the documents, plus the availability of the witness 
constituted additional facts necessary to invoke the due dili-
16. Other exceptions included where a crime has not been completed until after 
commencement of the initial prosecution, if no court had complete jurisdiction of all 
alleged crimes, and where defendant's motion for severance of charges is granted at the 
initial proceeding. 397 U.S. at 453 n.7 & 454 n.11. 
17. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
18. [d. at 169 n.7. 
19. 539 F. Supp. 296 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
20. The exception had been noted, though never relied upon, by other courts. See 
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420 n.8 (1980); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152 
(1977); United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1144 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
1020 (1980); United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1123-24 & n.5 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). 
21. 539 F.Supp. at 300. 
22. [d. at 300-01. 
23. [d. at 301. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 301-02. 
26. [d. at 302. 
27. The second indictment cited different dates than the first for these criminal 
transactions. [d. at 302. 
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gence exception to the double jeopardy bar.28 
The Allen court rejected the government's contention, hold-
ing that the due diligence exception applied only if the govern-
ment was unaware of the latter charge at the time of the first 
prosecution.29 
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The government conceded that the thefts charged were les-
sor included offensesso of the felony-rilUrder charge. As such, 
these offenses constituted the 'same offense' for double jeopardy 
purposes. SI 
The court employed a balancing test to determine whether 
the due diligence exception to the double jeopardy bar should 
apply.s2 The Ninth Circuit concluded that defendant's interest 
in avoiding the burdens of multiple prosecutions was outweighed 
by society's interest in punishing the guilty.sS 
28. Id. at 318. 
29. The Allen court held that "lack of proof, however, does not invoke the due dili-
gence exception. The exception applies only if, at the time of the first trial, the govern-
ment was not aware of the offenses which it failed to join." (Emphasis in original) Id. at 
319. This approach has been advocated by commentators who have addressed the due 
diligence exception. See Friedland, Double Jeopardy and Unreasonably Splitting a. 
Case, U. TORONTO L.J. 249 (1969). Friedland wrote that the proposed due diligence ex-
ception "would encompass situations . . . in which the prosecutor could not at the time 
of the first trial, have known . . . of the commission of the offenses subsequently 
charged." Friedland at 276. In Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Ashe where he 
first advanced the due diligence exception, he referred to Friedland's comprehensive ex-
amination of double jeopardy. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453 n.5 (1970) (Brennan, 
J.,concurring). See also Model Penal Code: "[a defendant should] not be subjected to 
separate trials . . . if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officers at 
the time of the commencement of the first trial." MODEL PENAL CODE 1.07(2) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962). See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice comment 2.3(c) Chap-
ter 13 (1980). "The subsequently charged offenses must be know to the prosecutor ... " 
30. In Stearns, theft was a lesser included offense of felony murder. In Harris v. 
Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977), the Court found that "when, as here, conviction of a 
greater crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser charge crime, rob-
bery with firearms, the double jeopardy clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after 
conviction of the greater one." Id. at 682. 
31. 707 F.2d at 393. 
32. Id. at 393. 
33. The court relied on Howard v. United States, 372 F.2d 294 (9th Cir.) cert. de-
nied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967), for the application of this balancing test. In Howard, the de-
fendant's first trial ended in a mistrial due to the inability of one jury to reach a verdict. 
Id. at 296. The government's second indictment included eight counts from the first in-
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The court then examined whether the due diligence excep-
tion was satisfied. They found that the government's search was 
aimed at every area of Palmyra likely to contain evidence of the 
Grahams disappearance. Although a more thorough search 
might have been possible, the court noted that "due diligence 
did not require extraordinary methods at this remote site."" 
The Ninth Circuit found that the government's search at Pal-
myra produced no evidence of the Graham's fate. The court held 
that the district court's determination that the government did 
not have the facts necessary to sustain the murder charge was 
not clearly erroneous.311 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the felony-murder prose-
cutions were not barred if the government was unable to prose-
cute the greater charge at the outset because "the facts to SU8-
tain"36 that charge were not discovered despite the exercise of 
due diligence. 
D. CRITIQUE 
In Stearns, the Ninth Circuit reduced the core constitu-
tional protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause first by employ-
ing an inappropriate balancing test to determine whether the 
due diligence exception applied; secondly, by inadequately ad-
dressing one of the exception's central requirements and finally, 
by failing to provide adequate guidelines for the future imple-
mentation of the due diligence exception. 
Stearns was a case of first impression. Although noted by 
other courts, the due diligence exception was merely a sugges-
tion contained in a footnote in the Supreme Court opinion of 
Brown v. Ohio. The Brown Court had provided no guidelines or 
safeguards for courts to weigh in deciding whether the exception 
should be employed. 
The Ninth Circuit employed a balancing test to determine 
dictment and six new counts. [d. Defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy 
grounds was denied and the defendant was found guilty on eleven counts. [d. at 297. The 
defendant appealed, arguing the double jeopardy applied. [d. 
34. 707 F.2d at 394. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. at 393. 
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whether the exception should be considered. The court never 
stated the reason for its use of this balancing test. The court 
may have believed that the test was appropriate due to the am-
biguity of the exception as precedent, or perhaps as a safeguard 
for defendants' double jeopardy protection. 
Relying on Howard v. United States, the court balanced de-
fendants interest in avoiding multiple prosecutions against soci-
ety's interest in punishing the guilty. However, Howard pre-
dated the procedural rules allowing a double jeopardy appeal 
prior to the second triata' In Howard, the defendant was con-
victed in a second trial and then appealed the double jeopardy 
ruling. The Howard court weighed society's interest in punishing 
the guilty because the defendant's guilt was established. 
In Stearns, the guilt or innocence of each of the defendants 
on the charge of felony murder had not yet been determined. 
The Ninth Circuit's assumption of defendants' guilt is contrary 
to the constitutional presumption of innocence. The use of guilt 
as a factor in the balancing test will virtually guarantee that the 
scales will weigh against the defendant. Rather than providing a 
safeguard, this balancing test will insure that defendants' double 
jeopardy protection will be circumvented. 
With respect to the due diligence exception, its application 
is contingent upon the satisfaction of an essentially two-pronged 
test. The first prong requires that the government exercise due 
diligence in its initial investigation. The courts should not con-
done prosecutorial negligence by allowing a second prosecution, 
when evidence which clearly should have been found is later dis-
covered. In addition, the due diligence requirement will discour-
age unscrupulous prosecutors from not fully investigating a 
greater charge, knowing that after trial on the lesser charge a 
second investigation could turn up the necessary facts to sustain 
a second prosecution. 
As Stearns indicates, the requirements of due diligence will 
often be easily satisfied. The nine-person government team 
spent ten hours searching the island. Their initial investigation 
was not a model of thorough and complete police work. Due to 
37. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1977). 
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high costs and extra time needed the government did not thor-
oughly search the lagoon where the Grahams' dinghy was found 
and where the skeletal remains were later discovered. The court 
reasonably concluded that due diligence requires no more than 
ordinary diligence, and inasmuch the government's initial inves-
tigation satisfied the requirements of the first prong. 
The second prong of the due diligence exception requires 
that the facts later discovered be necessary to sustain the 
greater charge. If the prosecutor possessed the facts necessary to 
sustain the greater charge at the time it prosecuted the lesser 
charge then any .facts later discovered, no matter how relevant, 
would be merely cumulative, and the exception could not be in-
voked. Applying the second prong to facts of Stearns, the deter-
minative issue for the Ninth Circuit should have been whether 
the government could have sustained the felony murder charge 
in 1974. 
The Stearns court's analysis of the requirements of the sec-
ond prong was done in a perfunctory manner. The only factor 
the court recognized was that the search of Palmyra produced 
no concrete evidence of the Graham's fate. The court did not 
deem it necessary to analyze the felony murder evidence which 
the government possessed prior to the first trial. 
If the government could have sustained the felony murder 
charge in 1974, then the due diligence exception would not ap-
ply. In order to sustain a felony murder charge, the following 
must be proven: (1) the defendant committed a felony; (2) the 
defendant had the requisite intent to commit this felony;88 and 
(3) a death, resulted from this act.89 In 1974 the government had 
sufficient facts necessary to sustain the first two conditions of 
the felony-murder charge. The discovery of a body is not neces-
sary to prove the third condition; "[A]ll that is required to prove 
death is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convince the minds 
of reasonable men of the existence of the fact. ".0 
The circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the 
38. United States v. Lilly, 512 F.2d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1975). 
39. Perkins, Corpus Delecti of Murder, 48 VA. L.R. 173, 1183 (1962). 
40. People v. Scott, 176 Cal. App.2d 458, 469 (Cal. 1959). 
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Grahams' was analogous to murders on the high seas,·· in which 
bodies are rarely found.42 The government possessed circum-
stantial evidence to support the charge that the Grahams were 
dead.48 and that this death resulted from defendants' actions.·· 
Was this evidence sufficient to sustain a felony murder 
charge? The ambiguity of the language of the second prong 
makes this determination uncertain. Neither the Supreme Court 
nor the Ninth Circuit provided adequate guidelines to determine 
what 'necessary to sustain the charge' required. However, three 
different approaches may be advanced to establish guidelines for 
the application of this prong. The first can be called the 
'prosecutorial discretion' standard; the second the 'discovery of a 
charge' standard; and the third the 'prima facie case' standard. 
41. In order to sustain the charge of murder, the government had to prove that the 
Grahams' death had occurred either on an uninhabited island or in the 1,000 miles of 
ocean that separate Palmyra and Hawaii. 
42. In a famous opinion Justice Story wrote that: 
In the case of murder on the high seas, the body is rarely if 
ever found; and a more complete encouragement and protec-
tion for the worst offenses of this sort could not be invented 
than a rule of this strictness. It would amount to a universal 
condonation of all murders committed on the high seas. 
United States v. Gilbert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1290 (C.C. Mass. 1834). 
43. The Grahams had not been heard from for over three months. They had stopped 
communicating with their regular radio contact in Hawaii. The Grahams stopped com-
municating with friends and relatives with whom they corresponded regularly. Appellant 
Sterns Opening Brief at 5, U.S. v. Stearns, 707 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983). 
44. See infra n.5 and 6. There is case law which suggests that the government's 
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain a murder charge. In United States v. 
Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. 636 (C.C. Me. 1858) seven sailors set out in a boat on July 7th. 
Nothing further was heard from them until September 2nd when three of them were 
found on the high seas in an open boat. They claimed that a storm had washed the 
others overboard. Later one of the sailors confessed. He died shortly thereafter. The 
other two sailors then confessed. At trial there was doubt whether the confessions were 
voluntarily made and whether they should have been considered by the court. The court 
examined the circumstantial evidence to see if the corpus delecti of murder was proven. 
The court found that the following evidence "strongly implicated the prisoners." Wil-
liams at 645. (1) The defendants and the missing men all left together in the same boat. 
(2) Neither the vessel nor the men arrived at their destined port. (3) The boat that the 
defendants had been found in (it originally was attached to the larger boat) had been 
tarred on the inside strongly, indicating preparation for a long voyage, thus disproving 
the claim of a hasty departure. (4) The defendants were found with the possessions of 
the missing men. (5) The defendants gave contradictory and false accounts of what hap-
pened. ld. at 645. 
The court found that this evidence, independent of the confessions, tended to 
"prove, not only that the crime had been committed but that it had been committed by 
the prisoners." Williams at 645. 
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Under the prosecutorial discretion standard, if the prosecu-
tor was not reasonably sure of a high probability of conviction 
on the greater charge at the commencement of trial on the lesser 
charge, then a second prosecution would be allowed when the 
facts needed for the successful prosecution were discovered. 
This standard would create a great potential for governmen-
tal abuse of defendants' double jeopardy protection. The court 
would be forced to determine whether initially the evidence in 
the prosecutor's possession was sufficient to sustain the greater 
charge. Inevitably great deference would be given to the prose-
cutor's judgment .. 
The Stearns court employed such a standard. Stearns indi-
cates the government would now be allowed to reprosecute the 
same offense when the discovered facts are among those merely 
important in proving the greater charge, rather than necessary 
to sustain it.411 The possibilities for the discovery of additional 
facts are limitless. Additionally, the government has a forum to 
'test the waters.' The government may be able to judge the 
probability of a successful prosecution of the greater charge by 
the outcome of the trial for the lesser charge. Hence, under the 
prosecutorial discretion standard the restrictions on 
prosecutorial abuse are so narrow that the due diligence excep-
tion may loom larger than the double jeopardy rule. 
A second approach would be one where the government 
must be unaware of the greater charge at the time of the first 
prosecution. This approach has been advocated by both the Al-
len court and commentators who have addressed the due dili-
gence exception. By being unaware of the greater charge at the 
time of the commencement of the first trial, the facts discovered 
amount to the discovery of the charge. 
The purpose underlying this approach is clear: by requiring 
that the government be completely unaware of the greater 
charge at the time of the first trial there is little potential for 
45. At one point, the court stated that the discovered facts need only be "relevant" 
to the greater charge. Stearns at 393. Later, when stating the requirement of the excep-
tion, the court omitted the word 'necessary'. [d. at 393. This may have been an oversight, 
but it typified the flaws in the court's analysis of this requirement. 
46. See infra n.29. 
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government abuse of able defendant's double jeopardy protec-
tion. Once the government is aware of the greater charge, they 
are obliged to perfect their case during the trial on the lesser-
included charge. 
Courts considering the implementation of the due diligence 
exception may find neither the discovery of a charge nor the 
prosecutorial discretion standard viable. The former standard 
provides manageable guidelines, but its narrowness may render 
the exception largely meaningless. The latter standard, while ac-
cording broad scope to the exception, may not only be unman-
ageable, but may grant the exception more scope than the rule 
itself. 
A final approach to the second prong of the due diligence 
exception can be called the 'prima facie case' standard. Under 
this approach, the government must first prove that it fully in-
vestigated the charges in accordance with the first -prong. If the 
government was aware of the greater charge which it did not join 
with the lesser charges, then the government must prove that it 
could not have supported a prima facie case of the greater 
charge when the lesser charge was tried. The defendant would 
be able to rebut the same. 
The guidelines for the 'prima facie case' standard should 
prove manageable; the due diligence exception would be viable 
in the unusual circumstances which call for its implementation, 
and defendant's double jeopardy protection from purposeful 
government abuse would be secured. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The due diligence exception to the double jeopardy rule was 
suggested by the Supreme Court to provide a workable system 
in which prosecutors would be compelled to join charges of the 
'same offense' in one proceeding. The outcome in Stearns en-
courages the opposite result. 
In Stearns the government elected not to prosecute the fel-
ony murder charge in 1974. Instead it prosecuted only the un-
derlying felony. Seven years later, the government elected to 
charge the defendants with first degree felony murder of Mrs. 
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Graham. Even then, the prosecutor decided that the government 
did not possess the necessary facts to charge the defendants 
with the felony murder of Mr. Graham. Thus, after the govern-
ment's $econd crack at the defendants, it will be allowed a third 
opportunity to charge them (if some additional fact used to sus-
tain the charge is discovered). This type of sequential prosecu-
tion undermines the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Steven H. Rosenthal* 
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District: What Constitutes 
Segregative Intent? 
In Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District,! the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a school district's refusal to bus for desegregation 
purposes was insufficient to prove segregative intent. 
Plaintiffs, the parents of Spanish-surnamed children attend-
ing public school in the San Jose Unified School District, alleged 
that defendants were operating a segregated school district.2 The 
district court initially determined that the school district acted 
without segregative intent.s The Ninth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case with instructions that defendants' neighbor-
hood school policy was not a complete defense to charges of seg-
regative intent, but instead given the same weight as any other 
evidence.4 On remand, the district court again found insufficient 
evidence to support a finding of segregative intent. II The plain-
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985. 
1. 705 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Kashiwas, J., sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Anderson, J., and Farris, J., dissenting). 
2. [d. at 1130. 
3. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District, 412 F. Supp. 310. 
4. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School district, 612 F.2d 411. See Columbus Board of 
Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 
526. 
5. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District, 518 F. Supp. 622. 
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Graham. Even then, the prosecutor decided that the government 
did not possess the necessary facts to charge the defendants 
with the felony murder of Mr. Graham. Thus, after the govern-
ment's $econd crack at the defendants, it will be allowed a third 
opportunity to charge them (if some additional fact used to sus-
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cuit held that a school district's refusal to bus for desegregation 
purposes was insufficient to prove segregative intent. 
Plaintiffs, the parents of Spanish-surnamed children attend-
ing public school in the San Jose Unified School District, alleged 
that defendants were operating a segregated school district.2 The 
district court initially determined that the school district acted 
without segregative intent.s The Ninth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case with instructions that defendants' neighbor-
hood school policy was not a complete defense to charges of seg-
regative intent, but instead given the same weight as any other 
evidence.4 On remand, the district court again found insufficient 
evidence to support a finding of segregative intent. II The plain-
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985. 
1. 705 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Kashiwas, J., sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Anderson, J., and Farris, J., dissenting). 
2. [d. at 1130. 
3. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District, 412 F. Supp. 310. 
4. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School district, 612 F.2d 411. See Columbus Board of 
Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 
526. 
5. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District, 518 F. Supp. 622. 
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tiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the district court's finding 
that the defendants displayed no segregative intent in maintain-
ing a non-integrated school system.s After finding that the de-
fendants knew the school district was racially imbalanced, but 
took no action to correct that imbalance, the Ninth Circuit ex-
amined several of the policy decisions made by the defendants 
over the past twenty years.7 Analyzing the district court's treat-
ment of these policy decisions, the majority found that the de-
fendants' actions, although continuing the racial imbalance in 
the district, were legitimate attempts to accommodate the dis-
trict's changing demographic and historical school attendance 
patterns while following a policy of assigning children to their 
nearest neighborhood schools.8 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
found no segregative intent behind defendants' actions.s 
The panel then turned to the issue of the defendants' re-
fusal to use busing between school attendance areas as a means 
to achieve district-wide integration.1o Although the defendants 
were aware that busing would be necessary to integrate the 
school system, they nonetheless refused to use busing to desegre-
gate. The majority was "disturbed"ll by the defendant's refusal 
to bus, but found no clear error in the district court's holding. I I 
The plaintiffs argued that the district's policy of no busing 
to desegregate was comparable to the impermissible racial classi-
6. See Keyes v.School District No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973). Keyes set forth the 
rule that segregative intent must be shown in de facto segregation situations. 
7. 705 F.2d at 1130. These policy decisions included (1) site selection and school 
construction, (2) adoption of a neighborhood school policy with board designated attend-
ance areas, (3) reconstruction of Field Act schools, (4) school closures and student reas-
signments, (5) location of portable classrooms and maintenance of double seasions, (6) 
student transportation, (7) presentation of materials supporting school bond elections, 
(8) response to integration proposals by a San Jose citizens committee, (9) faculty and 
staff assignments, and (10) failure to integrate despite a state statutory duty and a pub-
licly issued board policy to relieve ethnic imbalance. The Field Act was enacted to pro-
vide for earthquake-sille schools. Id. at 1130-31. 
8. Id. at 1131. 
9. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982). 
"10. 705 F.2d at 1131. The San Jose Unified School District routinely bused students 
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fication found in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.13 
In Washington, an initiative approved by the voters that effec-
tively banned busing to achieve racial integration was struck 
down by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional attempt to 
change the political process to prevent racial minorities from 
achieving their goals.H The Ninth Circuit distinguished Wash-
ington, noting that instead of interfering with the local school 
board's discretion, the school board in Diaz was allowed too 
much discretion to determine where children would be 
assigned. 111 
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that where a school district has 
a state imposed duty to integrate,18 a presumption of segregative 
intent arises from evidence of conduct with forseeable segreative 
consequences.17 The Ninth Circuit stated that the presumption 
the plaintiffs argued was in fact only a burden on the defendants 
to .show that actions perpetuating the segregated system served 
legitimate ends, a finding already made by the district court. is 
Additionally, the majority noted that in a federal court a duty 
imposed by state constitutional law served only as circumstan-
tial evidence of segregative intent. is 
Judge Farris, dissenting, asserted that the defendants acted 
to perpetuate segregation rather than promote integration. The 
dissent noted several instances where the defendants willfully 
rejected proposals to rectify the racial imbalance in the dis-
trict.so The dissent deemed the defendants only paid lip service 
13. 458 U.S. 457. 
14. Id. at 486. In striking down the initiative in Washington, the Supreme Court 
relied on the principle enunciated in Hunter v. Erikson, 393 U.S. 385 and Lee v. Nyquist, 
318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), that statutes preventing state officials from drawing 
school district lines to achieve racial balance were an unconstitutional violation of equal 
protection. 705 F.2d at 1132. 
15. 705 F.2d at 1132. 
16. Until 1979, the California Constitution empowered state courts to order desegre-
gation in cases of both de jure and de facto segregation. The Diaz case was brought in 
1975. See Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 
281 (1976). 
17. Id. The plaintiffs based their argument as to presumption of segregative intent 
upon Columbw and Dayton. Id. 
18.Id. 
19.Id. 
20. Id. at 1135. The dissent specifically mentioned the defendants rejection of pro-
posals for magnet schools, open enrollment, and voluntary busing, among other actions. 
Id. 
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to desegregation as their actions were diametrically opposed to 
integration. lit In light of the defendants' long history of rejecting 
practical integration measures, the dissent found sufficient evi-
dence of segregative intent. 
21. rd. at 1134. The defendants had, since 1963, repeatedly proclaimed that they 
recognized the racial imbalance in the school district and that they were determined to 
correct it. 412 F. Supp. at 315. 
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